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Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory;
CalibratingControls for Risk Aversion
By JAMESC. COX, VERNONL. SMITH,AND JAMESM. WALKER*
We offer a brief survey of bidding theory
in high price auctions, of experimental studies of behavior in such auctions, and of the
interplay between the design and results of
the experiments and efforts to further develop the theory. Two new series of experiments are reported. The first applies a convex transformation of payoffs in an attempt
to induce a lowering of subject bids "as
if" the bidders had become less risk averse.
The second applies a method for inducing
any prespecified utility function (for risky
choices) on an individual. We use it to induce "as if " risk-neutral behavior. Both series
use baseline control to "calibrate" the hypothesized effect of the procedures on "riskaverse" behavior.
I. Bidding Theory and its Development
under Testing

Early experimental papers testing William
Vickrey's (1961) noncooperative equilibrium
model of bidding behavior for risk-neutral
agents in single unit auctions report the
robust result that subjects tend to bid significantly higher than the predictions of the
model when the number of bidders is N ? 4,
but not when N = 3. (For citations to our
experimental-theoretical work, see the references in our 1984 article.) The results for
N ? 4 are consistent with extensions of the
Vickrey model which postulate that agents
all have the same concave utility for monetary surplus (for example, Charles Holt,
1980). However, these extensions also imply

that all bidders use the same equilibrium bid
function: bi(vi) = b(vi) _ bJ(vi), for all i,
where vi is the value of the auctioned item
(known only) to i and bn(vi) = (N-1 ) vi /N
is the Vickrey risk-neutral bid function when
each vi is drawn independently from the
constant density on [0, v-].We have tested the
null hypothesis that the bids submitted by
the N bidders in each experimental group
can be regarded as N samples from the same
population. It is rejected in 13 of 23 experimental groups. A straightforward conclusion
is that an appropriate extension of the model
should be based on the assumption of heterogeneous risk-averse bidders. We have
articulated such a model for single unit auctions and extended it to multiple unit discriminative auctions. Experimental tests of
the multiple unit model strongly support the
interpretation that bidders bid as if they
were heterogeneous and risk averse (we reject
the hypothesis of homogeneous agents in 24
of 28 experimental groups).
This constant relative risk-averse (CRRA)
model assumes that (a) each agent i chooses
bi to maximize EU(bi) = (vi -bi)'Gi(bi)
where Gi(bi) is the probability that bi is the
highest of N bids; (b) agent expectations are
rational, Gi(bi) = G(bi); (c) each vi in any
auction is drawn independently from the
constant density on [0, v-]; (d) the N agents
are drawn from a population with some distribution4(ri) on the characteristicri E (0,1].
For single unit auctions, these assumptions
imply the inverse equilibrium bid function
(1)
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vi = (N-I+

rJ)bi/(N-1),
forall biE [O,b],

where b = (N -1 ) v-/N is the maximum bid
that would be made by a risk-neutral agent.
(The solution for b > b has no closed form.)
Hence, if any two of N bidders (i, J) have
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distinct CRRA parameters (ri, rj), a prediction of the model is that in a sequence of
auctions t = 1, 2,..., T, the observed bids will
identify a distinct homogeneous linear bid
function for each bidder whose slope will
reveal each bidder's CRRA utility parameter.
We have conducted and reported two direct tests of the above CRRA model and its
multiple unit generalization. The first test
applies the following property of CRRA utility: a scalar change, a, in payoffs has no
effect on expected CRRA utility-maximizing
decisions. This is seen in (a) above if we
express expected utility in the form, EU(bi)
= [a(vi - bi)]riG(bi), where a(vi - bi) is the
outcome in U.S. currency for the winning
bidder. Since a affects only the scale of
utility it has no effect on the bid function (1).
We report paired comparison experiments in
which a = $1 in the control experiments and
a = $3 in the paired treatment experiments.
There is no significant difference in the outcomes between paired experiments. Similarly, if v- is increased, say tripled, this model predicts the same scalar increase in vi, b,
and vi - bi; that is, in (a) we can write expected utility in the form EU(pi) = [i-(vF v.
,L)]rG(,i), where [i = b/v,
vi =
Hence a scalar change in the vi has no effect
on normalized bids. We have reported comparison experiments (multiple units) in which
v- (and each vi) is tripled. The effect is to
triple average bids, and the conclusions based
on a = $1 are not altered when a = $3.
Since CRRA utility is the only utility function with these scalar invariance properties,
these experiments provide important independent support for the theory beyond the
earlier ex post analysis showing that observed bids are consistent with the assumption that agents are risk averse and heterogeneous. The new tests for scalar effects were
motivated a priori by the theory.
Two well-known "logical" objections to
all CRRA utility models are a recurring part
of the conventional wisdom connected with
expected utility theory (EUT), although
these objections are devoid of observational
support: (A) "CRRA utility is unacceptable
as it implies that absolute risk aversion grows
without bound as v - b approaches zero";
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(B) "The CRRA bidding model admits of a
tractable solution only if initial wealth is (or
can be normalized on) zero."
The a priorist objection (A) asserts that
any EUT model can be "tested" by examining its absolute risk-averse implications, and
that behavior near some boundary (zero) is a
crucial test of any hypothesis. This is like
arguing (without resorting to observation)
that the inverse square law of attraction is
falsified, since the force of attraction goes to
infinity as the distance between masses approaches zero! For the vast majority of subjects, when v is near zero, the ratio of bid to
value is similar to that for large values of v;
that is, one observes no peculiarity in bidding behavior near zero, which is predicted
by equation (1) based on CRRA utility. A
small minority of subjects bid either zero or
their value, at low values of v. This "throw
away" bid phenomenon can be interpreted
as the result of payoffs being so low that it is
not worth the trouble of a "serious" bid.
Since it is not clear what is "optimal" when
payoffs are at epsilon levels, other theories
such as random or erratic behavior should
not be discounted, just as in particle theory
(which is disciplined by data) other theories
take over in the small.
Concerning objection (B), we have been
quite explicit from the beginning in referring
to vi -bi as the monetary income from an
auction. This is because we accept the findings of a vast literature going back at least to
Markowitz, and corroborated by Mosteller
and Nogee, Davidson, Suppes and Siegel,
Edwards, Kahneman and Tversky, Binswanger, and others (see Mark Machina, 1982, for
numerous references). Generally this literature supports the relative invariance of risktaking decision behavior with initial wealth
(the "Markowitz hypothesis" of a horizontally shifting utility of wealth). Also, this
literature does not find support for constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) (Machina, p.
285). The prize to which EUT applies (wealth,
income etc.) is a hypothesisseparate from the
axioms of EUT which do not define that prize.
Various extensions of the original Vickrey
model and of Holt's identical bidders riskaverse model are contained in the literature.
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Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber (1982) consider the effect of information. However,
given the robust experimental result that bidders bid as if they are heterogeneous and risk
averse, these extensions (for first price and
Dutch auctions) are based on behavioral assumptions already shown to be inconsistent
with the data. Eric Maskin and John Riley
(1984) offer a potentially fruitful extension
based on the assumption of a one-parameter
where bi is i's
utility function u(-bi,Oi),
bid. If 9i= vi, we have the case of identical
bidders with differing private values, but with
the bidding commodity medium distinct from
the commodity item being auctioned. If 9i = ri
(any risk parameter), we have heterogeneous
risk-averse bidders, but, implicitly, all must
place the same value on the auctioned item.
Thus the minimum generalization requires a
utility function of the form u(vi - bi; ri) to
capture both taste and risk attitude diversity.
Cox and Smith (1984) develop an equilibrium bidding model for a utility function
of the form u(9- b,9 -1), where (,, &0) is
an M vector of characteristics.
II. Modelsof Controlfor the Effect
of RiskAversion
We interpret the observation that subjects
bid in excess of the predictions of the Vickrey
model as due to heterogeneous risk-averse
agents, and have used this interpretation to
develop an improved model. Subsequently
this model was found to be consistent with
the scalar invariance tests described above.
Now we ask whether direct methods might
be applied to examine this risk-averse interpretation of the data. Other interpretations are possible. We might assume in place
of (a) that agents choose bids to maximize
EU(bi) = (vi - bi)Gi(bi), and instead of (b),
that Gi(bi) = [G(bi)]l/ri, where I/ri is now
a characteristic of bidder i that transforms
the objective probability of winning, G(bi),
into a subjective probability of winning,
[G(bi )] l/ri. This subjective expected value
(SEV) model is prominent in psychology
(see Machina, pp. 290-91). It abandons
Muthian rational expectations, but the resulting model yields a bid function identical
with (1), and the two theories are observa-
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tionally equivalent on the basis of all experimental tests to date. The methodological
point is that the parameter ri is not observable; it is a construct based on an interpretation of what is driving behavior, and other
interpretations are potentially admissible. We
have adopted the heterogeneous risk-averse
interpretation because it is an integral part of
the traditional EUT, while the alternative is
thought to be "ad hoc." This does not mean
that EUT is "true," but that it appears that
there is not yet a sufficient basis for the
scientific community to abandon EUT.
We propose two payoff manipulation
models which, based on EUT, should have a
determinate effect as interpreted in terms of
risk aversion. If these models are "correct,"
and our interpretation that subjects are risk
averse is correct, the new data should be
consistent with these predictions.
Model I. In a first price auction, if subject i wins, suppose that instead of paying
(vi - bi) dollars to i we pay a(vi-b1)2 dollars, a > 0. In the CRRA model it is seen
that the problem now is to maximize EU(bi)
= [a(vi - bi)2]riG(bi)
and equation (1) becomes vi =(N-1 + 2ri)bi/(N-1),
for all bi
Thus
E[O,b], where b=(N-l1)v/(N+1).
if an individual's personal measure of CRRA
is 1- ri, under the payoff transformation of
Model I, that individual will behave "as if"
the CRRA measure had changed to 1-2ri.
This equation provides strong quantitative
predictions of the effect of the transformation. A weaker qualitative prediction is that
the individual will bid less under the transformation.
Model II. Instead of paying (vi-bi)
dollars to the high bidder, suppose we pay
the winner (vi - bi) unit lottery tickets. The
individual then participates in a lottery in
which he/she receives xl dollars in U.S.
currency with probability (vi - bi)/v and x2
dollars (xi> x2) with probability 1- (vi bi)/v. Suppose further that the N-1 low
bidders in the auction all receive x2 dollars.
Since the probability of xl is linearly increasing in (vi - bi), if EUT applies to individual
behavior this procedure will cause the individual to bid "as if" risk neutral (Alvin Roth
and Michael Malouf, 1979; Joyce Berg et al.,
1984). To see this, note that bidder i's deci-
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sion problem is to

(2)

max [Gi(bi)(ui(xD(Vib)

+ ui(X2)l

Vi-

-

)) + (1- Gi (bi))Ui(X2)4

erences in a market whose behavior is hypothesized to be driven by risk aversion.
To our knowledge this promising procedure has not been test-calibrated in a market
context; that is, used to induce particular
preferences in a market which yields predictions interpretable in preference terms. High
price auctions allow one to do this based on
the Vickrey risk-neutral special case.

Ui(Xl)-Ui(X2)]

x max [vi -bi) Gi.(bi)]+
bi
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III. ExperimentsandResults:ModelI,
QuadraticTransformation
Ui(XA)

which is formally equivalent to Vickrey, giving vi = Nbi/(N -1), if Gi(b,) = G(bi).
Berg et al. have generalized this procedure
to induce any prespecified preferences, which
they proceed to test experimentally using
CARA and constant absolute risk-preferring
(CARP) preferences. They provide a qualitative test by soliciting responses to a choice
between two bets, A and B, with the property that the induced CARA function implies
that A is preferred to B while the CARP
function predicts that B is preferred to A.
They report that significantly more than half
(88.3 percent) of the choices correspond to
the predictions. They also elicit minimum
selling prices for bets from the two groups
and compare these with the calculated certainty equivalents of the bets. The observed
prices reported by the subjects are then compared with those predicted to provide a
quantitative test of their model. For both
groups they reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between the average observed
prices and those predicted. However, the
average prices from the risk-averse group
tended to be systematically biased above the
predicted certainty equivalent. Also, the variance of the observed prices was high.
This is encouraging in that it provides
evidence favoring the gross predictive implications of inducing known preferences on
subjects. The procedure is potentially important in enabling one to (a) control for risk
aversion where other aspects of behavior are
the primary focus of the investigation (Roth
and Malouf), or (b) induce known risk pref-

Twelve subjects participated in three sessions each consisting of 4 bidders. Each session consisted of a baseline sequence (EiB)
of 20 auctions (12 in session 1) in which each
subject was paid one cent for each PLATO
experimental cent earned,
(3)

( cash cents ) = ( PLA TO cents),

followed by a transformation sequence
(El T) of 20 auctions in which for each
auction cash earnings were calculated using
(4)

(cash cents)

=

0.02 (PLATO cents )2.

In the PLA TO instructions for El T, tables
and graphs are used to inform the subjects of
the payoff implications of this transformation. After the first three sessions were completed, four of the subjects were recruited for
a fourth retest session consisting of 20 transformation auctions.
Our initial approach to comparing bidding
behavior in El T and EiB was twofold. First,
we ask whether the mean normalized bid of a
subject differs in a transformation experiment from that in a baseline experiment.
Since the value realizations from the uniform
distribution will differ in the two experiments, if i bids b* when the realized value is
v*, we normalize the bid by subtracting the
risk-neutral Vickrey bid, bn(v*). Thus, for
each i we compute the difference D1= bi*bn(Vi*) for each auction, giving a set of differences {Di'} in ElB and a set {DfT} in
El T. The means DiBi were positive for all
subjects, indicating that all were risk averse
in the baseline sequence. Also, Dif> 0 for all
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i, as each subject continues to exhibit risk
aversion under the transformation. Further- DT is positive for eight of the
more, D)5'B
twelve subjects indicating, as predicted, a
shift toward less risk-averse behavior with
the transformation. In the retest, session 4,
all four subjects bid lower in El T than in
EIB (one subject had bid higher in the earlier
session).
However, this apparently good support for
Model I could not withstand deeper examination. The payoffs in (3) and (4) imply
that a bid for a profit of less than 50 yields a
lower return under the transformation than
in the baseline, and vice versa for a bid with
potential profit in excess of 50. Aware of
this, in advance of the experiments we had
conjectured that a "satisficer" might bid relatively lower (higher) in El T at profit levels
below (above) 50, as a means of maintaining
E B performance in E T. A closer examination of individual bids revealed that this
effect was strong, contrary to the predictions
of Model I.
IV. Experiments and Results:
Model II, Lottery Payoffs

Twelve new subjects participated in three
sessions, each consisting of 4 bidders and
two parts. The first part was a sequence of 20
baseline experiments (E2B) with each subject paid one cent in cash for each cent
earned in the experiment. The second part
consisted of a sequence of 20 auctions (E2L)
in which subjects in effect earned one lottery
ticket for each cent won in an auction. Eight
of the twelve subjects were then recruited for
two retest sessions, 4 and 5, consisting of 20
auctions with the lottery payoff. The lottery
operated as follows: A box containing 1000
tickets, numbered consecutively, was displayed to the subjects. The high bidder in
each auction was assigned ticket numbers in
an amount equal to the bidders experimental
profit in cents. Thus, if the winning bidder
had a value of $8 and bid $6 when v = $10,
she might be assigned the lottery numbers
1-200. If the ticket she then drew was in the
range 1-200, she received a cash payoff of
$7.50. Otherwise, she received $0.25. All losing bidders received $0.25 in cash.
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Ten of the twelve subjects bid significantly
".as if" risk averse in E2B, but, contrary to
Model II, only one of these subjects was
induced to bid as if risk neutral in E2L. It
appears that Model II has one chance in ten
of making a correct strong form prediction.
This result was not changed for any subject
in the retest sessions 4 and 5. A weak form
prediction of Model II is that the difference
between baseline and lottery mean bids, D1B
is positive indicating a shift toward
-5L,
risk neutrality. Only six of twelve subjects
were consistent with this prediction.
V. Conclusionsof the
CalibrationExperiments
Model I, applying a quadratic payoff
transformation, predicts a doubling of the
"as if" CRRA parameter ri, or, more weakly,
a shift in the direction of lower bids (less
risk-averse bidding). The experimental results belie this prediction. A close examination of individual bidding suggests that subjects bid less only when the profit potential is
below the 50 cent "break-even" level. Above
this 50 cent potential profit level, subjects
tend to bid relatively higher. This can be
interpreted as a type of "satisficing" behavior in which subjects attempt to do at least as
well under the quadratic transformation as
in the baseline experiments. Does this test
invalidate the CRRA model of bidding? No;
literally, it questions the conjunction of the
CRRA model with the transformation of
Model I. Since the CRRA model has performed well in previous tests, Model I should
be the immediate focus of deeper examination. In particular, the results suggest the
need for a change in design that would
eliminate the break-even 50 cent profit defined by the intersection of the baseline and
quadratic payoff functions. The predicted result is that the hypothesized satisficing effect
will be eliminated. Of course, the theory
asserts that behavior should not be affected
by this artifact, but one would like to know
if the theory does better when the artifact is
removed. After all, these are not calculating
agents, and it may not be difficult to introduce perceptual distortions that alter equilibrium behavior.
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Model II predicts risk-neutral bidding for
any subject showing risk-averse bidding in a
baseline experiment. Since nine of ten subjects bid significantly above the risk-neutral
bid function under both lottery and monetary payoffs, these results do not support the
predictions of Model II. Given the generally
supportive results of earlier direct tests of the
bidding model, the predictive failure of
Model II can be interpreted as providing
(indirect) evidence against the compound lottery axiom of EUT that is essential in Model
II. Furthermore, these results may have implications for other research programs that
must postulate the behavioral validity of the
lottery procedure as a conditional in experimental tests of models that require risk attitude of agents to be controlled.
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